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A Financial Assessment of Municipal Fiber in the U.S.
Summary
In the interest of bringing high-speed broadband access to communities underserved by current Internet
service providers, many U.S. cities have initiated municipal broadband projects. Such efforts have received
favorable attention from those eager to help close the digital divide. This brief presents a first look at a new,
comprehensive empirical analysis of 20 U.S. municipal fiber builds for which financial data is available. The
findings show that half of the projects in this study are cash-flow negative, and based on their performance
from 2010-2014, 90 percent are unable to generate sufficient cash to recover their project costs within the
30-40 year life expectancy of a municipal fiber build. City leaders considering such projects, as well as state
and federal officials interested in supporting them, need to understand the documented costs and risks before
encouraging new municipal fiber programs to form.
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A Financial Assessment of 
Municipal Fiber in the U.S.
Christopher S. Yoo, JD and Timothy Pfenninger, JD
Over the last several years, municipal broadband service provided via fiber to 
the home (FTTH) has attracted significant attention from industry analysts, 
policy advocates, and the media.
News stories have pointed to FTTH projects in places 
like Chattanooga, TN, as success models that other 
cities should follow. In February 2015, the Federal 
Communications Commission attempted to open the 
door to more widespread use of municipal fiber by 
preempting state laws blocking cities from investing 
in broadband, only to see its efforts overturned by the 
courts the following year. Other countries have shown 
similar interest in constructing public fiber networks. 
In Europe, press reports calling for Gigabit broadband 
have led countries such as Germany and Great Britain 
to consider devoting resources from their Universal 
Service Funds to FTTH rollouts. The Australian gov-
ernment has invested US$36 billion to deploy fiber  
to its citizens through its National Broadband Net-
work (NBN).
At the same time, the fate of some fiber projects 
has provided reason for caution. Several promis-
ing U.S. projects bled substantial amounts of red ink 
before they were sold to private companies for a frac-
tion of their costs.1 Other municipalities, including 
Burlington, VT, and Monticello, MN, have defaulted 
on the debt they incurred to fund their fiber networks 
and now face credit downgrades. Google Fiber has 
SUMMARY
• In the interest of bringing high-speed broadband access to 
communities underserved by current Internet service providers, 
many U.S. cities have initiated municipal broadband projects. 
Such efforts have received favorable attention in the media, 
as well as support from many state and federal lawmakers 
and regulators eager to help close the digital divide.
• But is municipal broadband economically viable? There has 
been a dearth of concrete data for answering that question. This 
brief presents a first look at a new, comprehensive empirical 
analysis of 20 U.S. municipal fiber builds for which financial 
data is available.
• The findings provide considerable reason for caution. More 
than half of the projects in this study are cash-flow negative, 
and based on their performance from 2010-2014, 90 percent 
are unable to generate sufficient cash to recover their project 
costs within the 30-40 year life expectancy of a municipal 
fiber build.
• City leaders considering such projects, as well as state and 
federal officials interested in supporting them, need to under-
stand the documented costs and risks before encouraging new 
municipal fiber programs to form.
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halted further rollouts in new cit-
ies. And looking abroad, in 2013, 
prohibitive costs forced Australia 
to abandon further expansion of its 
ambitious FTTH initiative in favor 
of an approach providing new service 
through a mix of legacy technologies.
The debate between advocates 
and critics of municipal fiber has been 
hampered by the dearth of hard data 
on existing projects. This Issue Brief 
highlights the key takeaways from 
a comprehensive study of municipal 
fiber operations in the U.S. The core 
of the analysis is based on an empiri-
cal assessment of every U.S. municipal 
fiber build, applying the standard 
tools of financial analysis to data 
drawn from the official bond docu-
ments issued when the projects were 
launched and from the audited finan-
cial statements filed by these projects 
during a five-year period (2010-2014). 
In so doing, this research represents 
the first systematic effort to place 
the debate over municipal fiber on a 
sound empirical foundation.
THE CURRENT FTTH 
LANDSCAPE
The Executive Office of the Presi-
dent’s January 2015 report on Com-
munity-Based Broadband Solutions as 
well as trade and scholarly publica-
tions indicate that 88 local govern-
ments have deployed FTTH.2 Of 
these projects, only 20 reported the 
results of their broadband operations 
separately in their audited financial 
statements, with the others opting to 
combine their broadband and electric 
power operations into a single set of 
financial statements.3 
The audited financial statements 
provide data about the annual cash 
flows for all 20 of the projects that 
reported the financial performance of 
their broadband operations separately. 
A review of the bond instruments filed 
with the Municipal Securities Rule-
making Board (MSRB) provides the 
project cost and cost of capital for 13 
of the 20 projects. For the remaining 
seven projects, we estimated project 
cost and cost of capital by using the 
median values of the 13 projects for 
which we have data, which yielded a 
project cost per household of $2,215 
(normalized for 2010 dollars) and a 
cost of capital of 5.11%. The project 
cost data compare unfavorably to the 
$750 estimated cost per household 
of Verizon’s FiOS project and are 
much closer to the roughly $3,000 
per household figure that eventually 
led Australia to walk away from its 
FTTH builds. Note that the project 
cost data do not include any federal or 
state subsidies that municipalities may 
have received.
The cities with municipal fiber 
appear to be broadly representative of 
the overall U.S. population, but the 
median household income of $41,527 
is below the 2014 national median of 
$53,657. The data suggest that high 
median household income is no guar-
antee of a network’s solvency, as the 
only municipality in this study with 
a median household income above 
the national median (Monticello) has 
already defaulted on its FTTH debt 
obligations. These data permit us to 
assess the likelihood that these proj-
ects will be able to cover their costs 
through the standard tool used by the 
investment community to evaluate 
projects’ financial viability: Discounted 
Cash Flows (DCFs). 
MUNICIPAL FIBER’S 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
A LOOK AT CASH FLOWS
The financial community universally 
regards cash flow as more important 
than profitability, since it is cash flow 
(and not income) that determines 
whether an organization remains sol-
vent. Discounting the cash flows takes 
into account the cost of financing as 
well as the time value of money.
DCF analysis indicates that 11 of 
the 20 municipal projects were cash 
flow negative from 2010 to 2014, 
many of them substantially so. (See 
Table 1 for full results.) Unless these 
 1  These include Marietta, GA (1996-2004); Provo, UT 
(2004-2008); Quincy, FL (2004-13); Dunellon, FL (2011-
13); and Bristol, VA (2003-2016).
 2  Other sources include FTTH Council (2009) and Montagne 
and Chaillou (2010). Of these, two projects spanned 
multiple cities (the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga 
and the Utah Open Infrastructure Agency (UTOPIA)), and 
another was initiated by a county (Churchill County, NV).
 3  The fact that less than a quarter of U.S. municipal fiber 
builds reported their broadband operations separately 
does raise the possibility of sample bias. One possible 
motivation for combining operations into a single set of 
financial statements is to conceal a broadband operation’s 
poor performance. To the extent this is true, the results of 
our analysis are biased in favor of making municipal fiber 
appear more successful than would be the case had all 
of these projects reported their data separately. If so, our 
results should be regarded as a best-case scenario for 
municipal fiber.
 4  Caveat: the relatively small number of observations limits 
the statistical significance of these regressions.
NOTES
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eleven fiber projects substantially 
improve their performance, they will 
soon have to consider whether their 
citizens would be better off if they 
ceased operations. Of the nine remain-
ing projects, five would require over a 
century at current rates to recover the 
cost of their projects (Pulaski, TN; 
Tullahoma, TN; Chattanooga, TN; 
Powell, WY; and Brookings, SD). The 
DCF analysis of Chattanooga – the 
municipal fiber project most often 
held up as a role model – reveals it 
would take 412 years to break even 
at the performance levels achieved 
from 2010 to 2014. Two other projects 
would require over 60 years (Fayette-
ville, TN; and Windom, MN). Such 
results are problematic when the 
useful life of a fiber network is usually 
estimated to be 30 to 40 years.
The data identify two potential 
success stories. If Bristol, TN, were to 
maintain the results it achieved from 
2010 to 2014, its project would break 
even after 34 years of operation. That 
said, Bristol did not begin offering 
fiber until 2012. That means that 
the inclusion in the analysis of the 
stronger results for 2010 and 2011, 
when Bristol was offering only DSL 
service, may not be representative of 
the likely long-run performance of its 
fiber operations.
Our analysis also suggests that 
Vernon, CA, recovered its estimated 
project costs after only two years of 
operation, but the reasons for this 
quick turnaround limit Vernon’s use-
fulness as a model for other projects. 
Vernon is a small city outside of Los 
Angeles and home to only about 
100 residents, but over 1,800 busi-
nesses. The municipality is thus almost 
entirely comprised of commercial 
enterprises. This means that for Ver-
non, estimating project cost on a per-
household basis probably substantially 
understates its actual costs. Indeed, the 
City’s audited balance sheet indicates 
that the project cost was $3 million as 
 TABLE 1:  RESULTS FROM THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
Municipality Age of Project  Adjusted Project Cost per Total Years for Annual Rate of
 as of 2010 Project Cost  Household Discounted Project to Turn Revenue
  (2010 dollars)  Cash Flows, Positive Growth
    2010-14
Full Data Available:
Fayetteville, TN 10 -$14,039,772 $4,237 $1,141,877 61 4.53%
UTOPIA, UT 8 -$224,877,300 $1,547 -$7,188,982 never 16.77%
Kutztown, PA 8 -$7,050,207 $3,412 -$1,748,722 never 3.10%
Windom, MN 6 -$10,963,025 $4,709 $838,936 65 9.86%
Pulaski, TN 5 -$9,602,904 $2,425 $97,948 490 10.30%
Burlington, VT 4 -$36,383,199 $2,139 -$10,605,688 never 0.68%
Lafayette, LA 3 -$118,789,745 $2,215 -$36,086,333 never 35.94%
Tullahoma, TN 3 -$18,264,172 $2,053 $846,549 108 20.13%
Clarksville, TN 3 -$43,253,003 $765 -$7,442,513 never 23.65%
Chattanooga, TN 2 -$170,101,635 $1,099 $2,062,787 412 41.08%
Monticello, MN 2 -$27,767,517 $5,549 -$25,508,327 never 34.86%
Wilson, NC 2 -$30,649,795 $1,417 -$2,900,201 never 10.12%
Salisbury, NC 2 -$31,500,303 $2,224 -$1,702,339 never 103.82%
Project Cost and Cost of Capital Estimated:
Churchill County, NV 6 -$24,893,781 $2,215 (est.) -$470,833 never -2.39%
Vernon, CA 5 -$59,390 $2,215 (est.) $156,602* 2 16.63%
Loma Linda, CA 5 -$22,064,618 $2,215 (est.) -$2,445,825 never 10.32%
Bristol, TN 5 -$28,692,715 $2,215 (est.) $4,168,048 34 19.22%
Morristown, TN 4 -$28,779,887 $2,215 (est.) -$4,281,017 never 8.28%
Brookings, SD 4 -$20,252,,935 $2,215 (est.) $290,521 349 4.27%
Powell, WY 3 -$6,225,980 $2,215 (est.) $24,847 1,253 14.88%
 High 10 -$59,390 $5,549 $4,168,048 1,253 103.82%
 Low 2 -$224,877,300 $765 -$36,086,333 never -2.39%
 Median  4 -$26,299,149 $2,215 -$1,086,586 108 10.32%
 Standard Deviation 2.2 $57,141,294 $1,143 $9,549,916 375 22.06%
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of 2006, which would imply a pay-
back period of 110 years. In any event, 
Vernon’s commercial focus makes its 
FTTH build atypical and an inapt 
model for cities considering projects 
that are primarily residential.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
FTTH PROJECTS
The data permit us to construct two 
different estimates of how any hypo-
thetical project might perform. The 
first approach uses the actual returns 
achieved on a per-household basis 
by the projects we are studying to 
estimate how a future project might 
perform during the 14-year period for 
which we have data (excluding Vernon, 
because its commercial focus limits 
its usefulness for a per-household 
analysis). These data suggest that dur-
ing its first 14 years, a hypothetical 
project would have an aggregate loss 
of -$705 per household. Adding this 
to the average adjusted project cost per 
household of $2,215 yields a total cost 
of FTTH operations of -$2,920 per 
household over its first 14 years. 
The second approach employs 
regression analysis on the data to 
construct a model that extrapolates the 
financial performance of a hypothetical 
project beyond the 14 years for which 
we have data.4 Depending on the type 
of regression employed, the model 
estimates that a project would take 
from 81 to 318 years to break even. A 
separate regression allows us to explore 
whether these poor results are the 
result of weak revenue from attracting 
too few subscribers (measured by rev-
enue/household), inefficient operations 
(measured by operating cost/operating 
revenue), or from capital expenses that 
are too high (measured project cost/
household). Statistically, the speci-
fications including Vernon identify 
revenue per household as the statisti-
cally significant factor, while some of 
the specifications excluding Vernon 
indicate that operating efficiency is 
the key driver. Together these results 
suggest that marketing and operat-
ing expenses (opex) play more critical 
roles in the success of a municipal fiber 
project than capital expenses (capex).
Case studies of seven high-profile 
projects provide additional insight into 
the challenges that municipal fiber 
projects face in generating positive 
cash flows. Returning to Chattanooga, 
the Electric Power Board (EPB) began 
offering broadband service in 2009. By 
2014, it was earning more than $1,200 
per household in annual revenue. This 
compares favorably with the $446 
in annual revenue per household 
achieved by all of the municipali-
ties in this study. However, its annual 
positive cash flow during the five-year 
period from 2010 to 2014 of roughly 
$400,000 is dwarfed by the $162 
million in bond indebtedness EPB 
undertook to finance this venture. This 
analysis does not even consider the 
initial $50 million loan from the EPB’s 
electric power operations used to 
launch the project or the non-replica-
ble $111.5 million in federal stimulus 
funding that EPB received from the 
Department of Energy. The addition 
of stimulus funding to the analysis 
increases the break-even period from 
412 to 683 years. It bears noting that 
the financial performance of some of 
these projects may improve, and the 
high-level analysis may overlook key 
details that can help explain the results 
in particular cases. That said, the over-
all analysis provides a useful snapshot 
of the challenges that municipal fiber 
projects face. 
LESSONS FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS
Debates over municipal fiber have 
been long on rhetoric and short on 
empirical analysis. This Issue Brief 
attempts to fill that void and provide 
cities weighing whether or not to 
initiate a municipal fiber project with 
concrete data on which to base their 
decisions. The overall dataset provides 
considerable reason for caution—not 
just on the part of city leaders, but 
also lawmakers and regulators at the 
state and federal levels who have 
viewed municipal broadband as an 
economically viable tool for closing 
the digital divide. More than half of 
the projects in this study are cash-flow 
negative, and 90 percent are unable 
to generate sufficient cash during the 
period studied to recover their project 
costs within the life expectancy of 
these assets, which is between 30 and 
40 years. 
A closer examination of specific 
projects reveals that the risks and 
consequences are quite real. Many cit-
ies managing these projects have faced 
defaults, reductions in bond ratings, 
and ongoing liability that prevented 
them from undertaking other initia-
tives and exacted a toll on city leaders 
in terms of personal turmoil and dis-
traction from other matters important 
to citizens. City leaders should care-
fully assess all of these costs and risks 
in light of their own situations before 
permitting a municipal fiber program 
to go forward.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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